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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**  
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8       **Steven Wayne Divine,**  
Petitioner  
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10          **Ricardo E. Chavez,**  
Respondent

CV-08-1598-PHX-JAT (JRI)

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12       **REPORT & RECOMMENDATION**  
13       **On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus**  
14       **Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241**

15       **I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION**

16       Petitioner, incarcerated at the time in the Federal Correctional Institution in Phoenix,  
17       Arizona, filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  
18       2241 on September 25, 2008 (#64). On December 4, 2008, Respondents filed their Response  
19       (#79). Petitioner filed a Traverse on December 12, 2008 (#82). In addition, the following  
20       dispositive motions filed by Petitioner remain pending: (1) Motion to Withdraw Ground  
21       One, filed March 16, 2009 (#86); and (2) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, filed  
22       September 11, 2009 (#93).

23       The Petitioner's Petition and motions are now ripe for consideration. Accordingly,  
24       the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation  
25       pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of  
26       Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure.

27       **II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

28       **A. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CUSTODY**

29       Petitioner was convicted on October 3, 2003, in the Western District of Washington,  
30       of seven counts for Bank Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and five counts for uttering

1 Forged Instruments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(1) and (a)(2). Petitioner was  
 2 sentenced to a term of 33 months imprisonment, and ordered to pay a \$1,200 Crime Victim  
 3 Fund Assessment and restitution of \$35,411.02 through the Inmate Financial Responsibility  
 4 Program (IFRP), 28 C.F.R. § 545.10 *et seq.*, during his incarceration.

5 In January 2006, Petitioner was released from prison on supervised release, which was  
 6 transferred to the District of Oregon. On February 20, 2007, the court revoked Petitioner's  
 7 supervised release and sentenced Petitioner to a term of 36 months imprisonment. (#57, Dist.  
 8 Or. Order 8/19/08; Response, #79 at 1.)<sup>1</sup>

9 At the time of filing his First Amended Petition, Petitioner was serving his sentence  
 10 at the Federal Correctional Institution in Phoenix, Arizona. Petitioner was due to be released  
 11 on good time credits on May 5, 2009, with a final release date of September 23, 2009.  
 12 (Response, #79 at 2.)

13 Petitioner alleges that: (1) on August 7, 2007, he signed an "IFRP contract" under  
 14 threat of a loss of privileges at FCI-Phoenix; (2) on February 18, 2009, Petitioner was asked  
 15 to sign a new IFRP contract increasing the payments by 300%, and he refused; (3) Petitioner  
 16 then undertook a series of attempts to challenge the attempts to collect from him and to have  
 17 his "IFRP Refusal status" removed. (Memo. of Law, #65 at 3-6.) Copies of various  
 18 correspondence purporting to show his challenges are attached to Petitioner's Motion Filing  
 19 Supplemental Writings, filed October 1, 2008 (#66).

20 As of his July 2, 2009 Motion Requesting Immediate Judgment (#88), Petitioner had  
 21 been released from custody and had returned to Oregon.

22

23 **B. OREGON PROCEEDINGS**

24 On April 28, 2008, Defendant filed in the District of Oregon a Motion for Order  
 25 Enjoining Federal Bureau of Prisons from Collecting FRP Obligation. Upon motion of the  
 26 government, the District of Oregon denied the motion as an improper § 2241 habeas petition,

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28 <sup>1</sup> Unopposed allegations in the Response are generally deemed true. 28 U.S.C. § 2248.

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction due to Petitioner incarceration in the District of Arizona, and transferred jurisdiction to the District of Arizona. (Dist. Or. Order 8/19/08, #57.)

### **C. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS**

**Amended Petition** - Upon transfer of jurisdiction from the District of Arizona, the Court dismissed the petition with leave to amend. (Order 9/17/08, #63.) On September 25, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant First Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#64). Petitioner asserts three grounds for relief attacking the collection of the restitution payments.

In Ground 1, Petitioner argues that the under *U.S. v. Gunning*, 401 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005) (“district court simply does not have the authority to delegate its [restitution payment] scheduling duties”), the Bureau of Prisons cannot schedule restitution payments, and having done so, the collections from Petitioner were unauthorized. In Ground 2, Petitioner argues that it is too late for restitution payments to be scheduled by the court, because upon revocation of his supervised release, the original sentence was terminated.<sup>2</sup> In Ground 3, Petitioner complains that he has been advised by the United States Attorney that collections will be continued following Petitioner’s release.

In support of his Petition, Petitioner has filed a Memorandum of Law (#65), and a Motion Filing Supplemental Writings (#66). The Petition, Memorandum, and Motion were ordered served. (Order 10/21/08, #67.)

**Response** - On December 4, 2008, Respondent filed an Answer and Motion to Dismiss (#79).<sup>3</sup> In response to the Court's Order to Show Cause concerning the improper

<sup>2</sup> The undersigned does not construe this as an assertion that the restitution sentence was invalid when rendered, but that it was terminated by issuance of the sentence on revocation of supervised release. If Petitioner sought to attack the validity *ab initio* of the restitution sentence, this Petition would likely be subject to dismissal as an improper motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

<sup>3</sup> The Answer and Motion to Dismiss erroneously identify the Respondent as United States of America. (#79 at 1.) However, in the Notice to Show Cause, filed December 9,

1 filing of a dispositive motion in lieu of an answer without leave, Respondent filed a Notice  
 2 to Show Cause (#81) asserting that the motion to dismiss had been included to avoid waiving  
 3 the exhaustion defense. As a result, the Motion to Dismiss was stricken as improperly filed.  
 4 (Order 12/23/08, #83.)

5 Respondent's Response (Answer) argues that Petitioner's administrative remedies are  
 6 unexhausted, and that Petitioner's Claims are without merit.

7 **Traverse** - On December 12, 2008, Petitioner filed a Traverse (#82), arguing that his  
 8 administrative remedies are properly exhausted because: (1) Petitioner engaged in a series  
 9 of correspondence at all levels, opposing his restitution payments; (2) in light of the existing  
 10 rules of BOP, and BOP's enforcement in the face of court invalidation, any further attempt  
 11 at administrative resolution would have been futile; (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act's  
 12 exhaustion requirement does not apply to habeas petitions, and thus any exhaustion  
 13 requirement is judicially imposed, and not jurisdictional.

14 Petitioner further argues that his claims have merit, and that Respondent has failed to  
 15 respond to his Ground 3 challenge to post-incarceration collection efforts.

16 On December 29, 2008, Petitioner filed a Notice of New Decision (#84), advising of  
 17 the decision in *United States v. Ward*, 1:02-CR-5231-01 (E.D.Ca. 2008).

18 **Motion to Withdraw Ground 1** - On March 16, 2009, Petitioner filed a Motion  
 19 Withdrawing Ground One (#86), advising of his release from prison, and thus that Ground  
 20 1 is now moot. Respondents have not responded.

21 **Supplements** - On August 20, 2009, the undersigned noted the potential impact on  
 22 jurisdiction and parties as a result of Petitioner's release, and directed a supplemental  
 23 response by Respondent. Respondent filed his Supplemental Response (#91) on August 25,  
 24 2009. Respondent argues that "the proper respondent, if any, is the United States Attorney's  
 25 Office in the District of Oregon." (#91 at 3.) Respondent concedes that because Petitioner  
 26 was in custody at the time of his petition, and the collection of restitution is a collateral  
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28 2009 (#81), Respondent Chavez identifies the filing as his own.

1 consequence, jurisdiction is ongoing. Respondent does not address the personal jurisdiction  
2 of the Court.

3 On September 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Reply (#92), reurging his early  
4 arguments, and not addressing the proper respondent or jurisdiction of the Court.

5 **Motion for Temporary Restraining Order** - On September 11, 2009, Petitioner filed  
6 a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (#93), seeking a stay of restitution collection  
7 efforts. Respondents filed their Response (#94) on September 16, 2009.

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### 9 III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

#### 10 **A. MOTION TO DISMISS GROUND 1; MOOTNESS**

11 Petitioner has moved, without opposition, to dismiss Ground 1 of the Petition. A  
12 motion for voluntary dismissal following a responsive pleading may be made by court order.  
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Here, Petitioner argues his Ground 1, which challenges the  
14 collection of restitution by the Bureaus of Prisons has been rendered moot by his release from  
15 prison.

16 “The case-or-controversy requirement demands that, through all stages of federal  
17 judicial proceedings, the parties continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the  
18 lawsuit.” *United States v. Verdin*, 243 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation  
19 marks and citation omitted). Ordinarily, a habeas petition challenging only the sentence may  
20 be rendered moot when the complained of custody has terminated. *Lane v. Williams*, 455  
21 U.S. 624 (1982). The petitioner may avoid a finding of mootness on a showing that either (1)  
22 there are collateral consequences that may be avoided by granting the requested relief, or (2)  
23 the situation is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” *Cox v. McCarthy*, 829 F.2d 800  
24 (9th Cir. 1987).

25 Here, Petitioner’s challenge to the BOP collection procedures was rendered moot by  
26 his release from prison. Moreover, there appear to be no collateral consequences flowing  
27 from the IFRP collections by BOP. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent urge any. Thus, the  
28 undersigned finds no collateral consequences.

1       Neither Petitioner nor Respondent urge the application of the “capable of repetition”  
2 doctrine. *See e.g. Cox v. McCarthy*, 829 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1987) (considering application  
3 of doctrine to otherwise moot habeas petition). However, it is conceivable that Petitioner  
4 could be re-incarcerated (although, apparently not on the present case), and thus subject  
5 again to collections by the BOP. However, it is not apparent why such occurrence would  
6 evade review. Thus, the undersigned concludes it does not apply, and that a dismissal  
7 without prejudice would leave open an opportunity for future litigation should re-  
8 incarceration occur.

9       Conversely, Petitioner’s challenges in Grounds 2 and 3 to the continuing validity of  
10 the sentence, and future attempts to collect restitution are still active controversies. For  
11 example, this Court could issue a judgment finding the restitution sentence terminated, and  
12 thus further collection attempts unauthorized. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that  
13 Grounds 2 and 3 are not moot.

14       Rule 41(a)(2) provides that a voluntary dismissal upon court order is without  
15 prejudice, unless otherwise directed. In light of the concerns about repetition, the  
16 undersigned concludes that a dismissal without prejudice is appropriate.

17       Alternatively, this Court could decline to address the mootness of Ground 1 and  
18 simply transfer the petition (as recommended hereinafter), as a whole. Because Ground 1  
19 relates to the current Respondent, this Court retains not only subject matter jurisdiction, but  
20 also personal jurisdiction, to resolve the matter. Given the lack of dispute among the parties  
21 and the necessity of making the underlying findings as to Petitioner’s custody as a  
22 prerequisite to the transfer of jurisdiction, the undersigned concludes that resolving the  
23 mootness of Ground 1 is the appropriate course.

24       Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend the dismissal of Ground 1, without  
25 prejudice.

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27 **B. JURISDICTION OVER REMAINING CLAIMS**

28       Petitioner’s remaining claims focus on the status of the Washington restitution

1 sentence. In Ground 2, Petitioner argues that the original sentence was terminated by  
 2 issuance of the revocation sentence, and thus it is too late for restitution payments to be  
 3 scheduled. In Ground 3, Petitioner complains that he has been advised by the United States  
 4 Attorney that collections will be continued following Petitioner's release, and, liberally  
 5 construed, that such action should be enjoined because that sentence has been terminated.  
 6 Indeed, he makes such request explicit in his Motion Requesting Immediate Judgment on the  
 7 Pleadings (#88).

8 Given Petitioner's release, resulting absence from the District of Arizona, and  
 9 limitation of his claims to attacks on the validity of the sentence, the question arises whether  
 10 this Court retains jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup>

11       **Subject Matter Jurisdiction** - “[P]etitions that challenge the manner, location, or  
 12 conditions of a sentence's execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 *in the custodial*  
 13 *court.*” *Hernandez v. Campbell*, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).

14       Petitioner's arguments that continued collection of restitution is unauthorized because  
 15 the sentence was terminated is still at least arguably appropriately brought pursuant to §  
 16 2241. *See Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree*, 162 F.3d 548 (9th Cir. 1998) (resolving challenge  
 17 to restitution by federal inmate under 2241). *Cf. United States v. Thiele*, 314 F.3d 399, 401  
 18 (9th Cir. 2002) (challenge to restitution not permitted in motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. §  
 19 2255). However, “a habeas petition filed pursuant to § 2241 must be heard *in the custodial*  
 20 *court . . . even if the § 2241 petition contests the legality of a sentence.” Hernandez*, 204  
 21 F.3d at 865.

22       Thus, Petitioner's release from custody in Arizona (and return to Oregon) would  
 23 ordinarily mean that this Court would not have jurisdiction over the Petition.

24       However, the custody requisite to jurisdiction under § 2241 is determined at the time  
 25 of the filing of the petition. A subsequent release from custody does not terminate previously  
 26 attached jurisdiction. *Carafas v. LaVallee*, 391 U.S. 234, 239-241 (1968). Nor does a

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27       <sup>4</sup> The undersigned is not unmindful of the potential ping-pong effect on Petitioner of  
 28 having this issue raised again.

1 removal of the Petitioner from the district. *Ex parte Mitsuye Endo*, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944).  
2 See also *Rumsfeld v. Padilla*, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004). The only requirement for continued  
3 jurisdiction is continuing personal jurisdiction, *i.e.* that “a respondent who has custody of the  
4 prisoner is within reach of the court's process.” *Endo*, 323 U.S. at 306.

5 Accordingly, despite Petitioner's release, this Court could continue to exercise  
6 jurisdiction, but only if it has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over Petitioner's custodian.

7 **Proper Respondent** - Here, the only person with “custody” of the Petitioner is the  
8 United States Attorney for the District of Oregon, who Petitioner contends is pursuing  
9 collection of the restitution.

10 Indeed, it is the United States Attorney who exercises control over such collection.  
11 “The Attorney General shall be responsible for collection of an unpaid fine or restitution.”  
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 3612(c). Authority for establishing policies for collection of restitution is  
13 delegated by 28 C.F.R. § 0.171 to the Director of the Executive Office for United States  
14 Attorneys. The United States Attorney Manual, adopted by *inter alia* the Executive Office  
15 for United States Attorneys, provides in section 3-12.600 for the collection of restitution by  
16 the various United States Attorneys. U.S.A.M. § 3-12.600, 1999 WL 33219726 (November  
17 2000).

18 Inasmuch as Petitioner (and presumably his income and assets) are located in the  
19 District of Oregon, collection of restitution by the United States Attorney for the District of  
20 Oregon is to be anticipated, and according to Petitioner is at least threatened. Thus, it is that  
21 attorney who continues to exercise “custody” over Petitioner.

22 **Personal Jurisdiction** - However, the United States Attorney for the District of  
23 Oregon is presumably within that district, and not within the District of Arizona. This Court  
24 is authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person outside this District if the  
25 custodian “could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction” in the  
26 District. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Rule 4.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure  
27 gives the Arizona courts jurisdiction over persons outside the state “to the maximum extent  
28 permitted by the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.”

1 However, “[d]ue process requires that a nonresident defendant have certain minimum  
 2 contacts with the forum state so that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional  
 3 notions of fair play and substantial justice.” *Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, --- F.3d -  
 4 --, 2009 WL 2634795, 3 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. Aug. 28, 2009) (citing *Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326  
 5 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Thus, this Court can exercise jurisdiction over the United States  
 6 Attorney for the District of Oregon only if the attorney has had the requisite “minimum  
 7 contacts” within the District. *See e.g. Cook v. Fox*, 537 F.2d 370, 371 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1976)  
 8 (“federal court sitting in Michigan... [did] not sufficiently affect persons or property in  
 9 Arizona to create even the minimal contacts necessary to satisfy due process” for the District  
 10 of Arizona to exercise personal jurisdiction over Michigan federal judge).

11 No basis has been shown for finding that the United States Attorney for the District  
 12 of Oregon has had any contacts within the District of Arizona, let alone sufficient contacts  
 13 so as to justify hauling that attorney into court in this district. Accordingly, the undersigned  
 14 concludes that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Oregon U.S. Attorney, the only  
 15 proper respondent.

16

17 **C. TRANSFER**

18 This Court could dismiss this matter for lack of jurisdiction over the only possible  
 19 respondent. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides: “The district court of a district in which  
 20 is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the  
 21 interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been  
 22 brought.”

23 The conditions for transfer are: (1) the transferring court is the wrong district; (2) the  
 24 transferee court is one in which the action could have been brought; and (3) justice calls for  
 25 the transfer.

26 Here, as discussed above, the District of Arizona no longer has the personal  
 27 jurisdiction to resolve this matter. Section 1406(a) “has been held to authorize the transfer  
 28 of a case so as to cure the lack of personal jurisdiction in the district where the case was first

1 brought.” *Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc.*, 705 F.2d 1515, 1523 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir.  
 2 1983) (citing *Goldlawr v. Heiman*, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1961).

3 The District of Oregon now has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s current custodian, and  
 4 thus the action could now be brought there.

5 Moreover, “[n]ormally transfer will be in the interest of justice because normally  
 6 dismissal of an action that could be brought elsewhere is ‘time consuming and  
 7 justice-defeating.’ ” *Miller v. Hambrick*, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting  
 8 *Goldlawr*, 369 U.S. at 467)). The undersigned divines no reason to not transfer, and thus  
 9 finds that justice calls for the transfer.

10

11 **D. PENDING MOTIONS**

12 Petitioner has pending his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, filed September  
 13 11, 2009 (#93), in light of this Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over the target of that  
 14 motion, and the intent to transfer this case to the District of Oregon, the undersigned will  
 15 make no recommended disposition of this motion, apart from the effect of that transfer.

16

17 **IV. RECOMMENDATION**

18 **IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED** that the Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw  
 19 Ground One, filed March 16, 2009 (#86) be **GRANTED**.

20 **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that Ground One of the Petitioner's First  
 21 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed September 25, 2008 (#64), be  
 22 **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE**.

23 **IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED** that the remainder of the Petitioner's First  
 24 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed September 25, 2008 (#64), and this case,  
 25 be **TRANSFERRED** to the United States District Court of the District of Oregon.

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27 **V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION**


28 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

1 Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to *Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of*  
2 *Appellate Procedure*, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment.

3       However, pursuant to *Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, the parties shall  
4 have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which  
5 to file specific written objections with the Court. *See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing*  
6 *Section 2254 Proceedings*. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file  
7 a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal  
8 determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to *de*  
9 *novo* consideration of the issues. *See United States v. Reyna-Tapia*, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9<sup>th</sup>  
10 Cir. 2003)(*en banc*).

11  
12 DATED: September 30, 2009  
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JAY R. IRWIN  
United States Magistrate Judge

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